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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate wholesale electricity prices integration process in the main European markets. 
After reforms introduced in the last decades in Europe, wholesale electricity prices are now determined in 
regulated markets. However, while market institutional frameworks show several similarities, there are 
still differences in fuel mix, generation units technologies, market structure. Using multivariate 
cointegration techniques we test integration dynamics within four European markets (Austria, Germany, 
France and Italy) for which we have collected a novel dataset of spot prices from 2004 to 2010. We 
provide evidence that German market constitutes a common stochastic trend driving the long-run 
behavior of other markets. Our results are robust to causality test, to Granger causality test, to oil price 
relevance test and provide additional evidence to assess the efficient market hypothesis in European 
electricity markets. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The liberalization process of electricity markets in Europe is more than a decade old, 
based on three steps (EU Directives in 1996 2003 and 2009), all with the common 
objective to push member countries to modify their national electricity markets 
architecture in order to achieve market integration1.  
The goal of market integration has been pursued promoting unbundling of existing 
vertically integrated companies, competitiveness in the wholesale generation capacity, 
free entry of new plants, creation of independent (or state owned) transmission system 
operator, increasing consumer choice possibility and regulation of trade across 
international inter-connectors (Pollitt, 2009). As highlighted by Green (2007), the first 
step represented a compromise that took in account heterogeneity in National electricity 
markets liberalization processes, while the second step focused on regulatory issues, 
such as creation of "independent national regulatory authorities" (Cornwall, 2008). 
Finally, the third package of directives is based on the results of an inquiry conducted 
by the Commission (EC 2006) throughout 2005-2006 that mainly showed that there 
exists excessive horizontal concentration in generation; excessive vertical integration 
between generation and transmission; insufficient interconnection among national grids 
(Trillas, 2010). During this relatively long period, former national monopolies have 
been broken up, antitrust measures have been enacted to attempt to spur competition, 
mergers and restructuring of big players in generations have taken place at the 
international level. In the meantime, fuel prices have rolled up and down and a major 
financial crisis has shocked financial and real markets. In this situation, it is interesting 
to ask whether national markets formerly dominated by a national monopolist have 
developed some form of interaction. 
However, national electricity markets do not resemble financial markets, for they 
largely serve local needs. So interaction cannot be considered of the type prevailing in 
Stock Exchanges or other markets where paper assets are traded. However, it is 
undeniable that the large market restructuring which occurred in Europe has made more 
likely that decisions and price strategies are taken simultaneously on several markets, 
based on a common set of available information. 
Thus, even if, from a physical viewpoint, the possibility to exercise time and space 
arbitrage in electricity markets is limited, it is conceivable that fuel price information 
available at the strategic decision center of one big multinational electricity generation 
company can be shared throughout its subsidiaries acting in different markets. 
This gives rise to the idea that signaling may quickly spread around markets, even if 
these are physically separated; i.e. even if there are no relevant physical 
interconnections that allow a significant cross-border trade among countries, thus 
suggesting that efficient competition structure should prevail. On the contrary, despite 
EU and national regulatory efforts, there exists undeniable literature evidence that 
                                                 
1 The milestones of EU deregulation process in electricity market are the following. In 1996 a 
Parliamentary agreement was reached on market liberalization directive; in 1997 the Directive 96/92EC 
was enacted concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity;  in 1999 there was end of the 
transposition period; in 2001 a directive was adopted on the promotion of electricity from renewable 
energy sources in internal electricity markets; in 2003 directive 2003/54 was adopted; in 2007 there was 
the publication of the results of a competition investigation criticizing  the state of competition in the 
electricity sector; in April 2009 there was the enactment of the 3rd package of directives concerning 
electricity markets (2009/28). 
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organized electricity spot markets are far from the ideal competitive model. For 
instance, the Commission itself (EC 2007) admitted that the relevant market definition 
is national, as far as merger and acquisition rulings are concerned. 
There exists a widely consensus on this point. Many scholars showed that there are 
quite different electricity market models in Europe2, characterized by marked 
differences in terms of ownership type and degree of: openness, concentration, vertical 
integration, independence of authorities and unbundling effectiveness (network 
transmission, network distribution), along the electricity sector value chain. 
In a comparative perspective, Glachant and Levêque (2009, p.3) warn that: “The 
construction of the European Union’s ‘internal energy [electricity included] market’ is 
still a work in progress. It might even stall.” 
Given this situation, we know that in a competitive model price formation should be 
primarily influenced by international fuel price fluctuations and that in non competitive 
markets other behaviors and shocks may influence price formation (ranging from 
international fuel price, to local weather conditions, and to local market power 
behavioral shocks). For these reasons, we avoid the idea of testing market efficiency 
(Lu et al., 2005) or of testing EU policies success, i.e. that electricity markets are 
evolving consistently with the European Commission projects (Bosco, et al. 2010, 
Pelagatti et al., 2007). 
Given that theoretical competitive market designed by EU in reality does not exist, 
every conclusion in favor of integration is bound to be false, because we know that there 
is not a competitive market. Alas, every conclusion against integration is tautological, 
because we know already that there is not a general competitive market in Europe.  
For similar reasons, even if it is true that fuel price fluctuation should largely influence 
electricity prices trading in the market place, strategic bidding behaviors can provide 
countless reasons for obscuring the existence of a stable correlation between the fuel 
market prices and the electricity market prices. 
Based on previous considerations, the primary focus of this paper is to investigate 
whether there exists some information signaling among different European, rather than 
to investigate the existence of a structural relationship between fuel prices and 
electricity prices. In this respect, we adopt a weak assumption on market behavior, for 
we simply assume that it is rational for suppliers and buyers to adjust their behavior 
according to available information. Given the previous rather weak assumption, it is 
efficient for a rational agent to process and incorporate information in his own decision 
mechanism, taking into account all relevant information available.  
In this paper we use hourly data about four European electricity pool markets: Austria, 
Germany, France and Italy for the 2004-2010 period. In this paper, we explore the 
degree of integration among four electricity pool markets utilizing Johansen's (1995) 
maximum likelihood (ML) extension of the Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration 
framework. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the empirical framework is outlined. 
Section 3 presents data and preliminary analysis. In Section 4, results from dynamic 
simulations based on forecast variance decomposition are discussed. Some final 
remarks follow in the concluding Section 5. 
 
 
                                                 
2 An exhaustive review of these differences is available in Erdogdu (2010). 
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2. The empirical framework 
 
In the last years, many scholars have focused on the restructuring process in the 
European Electricity market. Considering only spot markets, the main topics 
investigated are prices convergence (among others Zachmann, 2008), prices dependence 
(Lindström and Regland, 2012), integration (among others Bunn and Gianfreda, 2010), 
cross-border integration (among others Balanguer, 2011; Cartea and Gonzàlez-Pedraz, 
2011) and corporate concentration (among others Thomas, 2007; 2009). Furthermore, 
prominent researchers have analyzed the whole  liberalization and integration process 
(see among others Glachant and Levêque 2009; Politt, 2009). 
A large part of this empirical literature agrees on the incompleteness of the integration 
process in European electricity markets. Nevertheless, some authors underline the 
existence of some positive results. Firstly, evidence of convergence and dependence in 
spot market prices can be detected if off peak hours and/or days are considered. For 
instance, Zachman (2008) shows that 59% of the analyzed hourly pairs of national 
wholesale electricity prices converged in the period 2002-2006, especially in off peak 
periods. Among the several countries analyzed by Zachman, Germany seems the most 
integrated market with a high correlation with the French market (ibidem, p. 1666). 
More recently, Lindström and Regland (2012, p. 13), analyzing only extreme events, 
find that in term of pair wise dependence between markets dependence varies from 
almost independent to strongly dependent and that dependence is not symmetric. In 
particular German Market is regularly co-spiking (upward movements) with all markets 
(French included) except the Scandinavian one and (ibidem, p. 12): “[it] has a large 
conditional probabilities of experiencing downward movements when a neighboring 
market also experiencing the same event.” The crucial role played by German market is 
also underlined by Bunn and Gianfreda (2010, p. 285). They find evidence of high 
integration in shock transmission among German market and other ones. 
Another relevant aspect concerns the corporate analysis in term of competitive 
positions. In its frequently reports Thomas (2007, 2009) highlights that among the 
“Seven Brothers” (Thomas, 2003) E.ON -Endesa, EDF and Electralabel play a crucial 
role in several markets3. The pervasive presence of the major companies in several 
markets could determine both high concentration ratio and strategic interaction in 
different markets that can lead to anticompetitive behaviour. 
We start addressing the question of whether European electricity market have 
experienced convergence patterns  in the last years. According to stochastic definitions 
of convergence and common trends based on cointegration analysis of Bernard (1991), 
a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for convergence among countries and/or 
markets is that there be n-1  cointegrating vectors for a sample of n countries or 
markets. Thus, we use a multivariate specification for the system of n electricity spot 
prices equations according to a Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) process of order p  
1
p
y
t l t l t
l
−
=
= ⋅ +∑y A y ε                 (1) 
                                                 
3 In particular E.ON-Endesa  is "home market" in Germany and Spain and it has "significant holdings" in 
UK, Italy, Benelux and Nordic market. EDF is "home market" in France and has "significant holdings" in 
UK, Germany and Italy while Electrabel is "home market" in France and Benelux and has "significant 
holdings" in Italy and limited in Germany (Thomas, 2007). 
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where yt  is a n-dimensional vector of electricity prices. Equation (1) can be represented 
in its isomorphic Vector Error Correction (VEC) form: 
1
1
1
Δ Δ
p
y y
t t l t l t
l
−
− −
=
= ⋅ + ⋅ +∑y Π y P y ε  , tε ∼ ( ),N ε0 Σ            (2) 
where εΣ  is the time-invariant variance-covariance matrix associated to the vector of 
residuals tε . VEC modelling builds on the association between the economic concept of 
long-run and the statistical concept of stationarity and focuses on the identification of 
stationary linear combinations of the data, known as cointegration vectors. In the 
presence of cointegration qΠ has reduced rank r<n  and can be decomposed as 
′= ⋅qΠ α β , where matrix α  contains the feedback coefficients (loadings) and matrix β  
contains r<n  theory-based long-run relationships to which the series converge, once all 
the effects of transitory shocks have been absorbed (Johansen, 1995). These 
cointegrating relationships are hit by n-r  permanent shocks (the common trends). Rank 
of matrix yΠ  allows to identify different long-run equilibrium path for the electricity 
prices. If all elements of vector ty  are unit root processes, the rank of matrix yΠ will be 
equal to zero and in this case will be impossible to identify a long run equilibrium 
condition among electricity prices. In any intermediate result with a reduced rank of 
matrix yΠ  we can identify a long run representation of the integration process between 
markets. 
 
3. Data and preliminary analysis 
 
3.1. Data description and unit root analysis 
 
For the empirical analysis we employ data registered in four European wholesale 
markets, EXAA (Austria), EEX (Germany), Powernext (France) and IPEX (Italy) for 
hourly time series of spot electricity prices4, labelled: AU, DE, FR, IT. All prices are 
expressed in €/MWh. These markets share similar marginal generation technology but 
differ in generation fuel mix, as shown in Table 1; in Italy generation capacity is skewed 
toward hydrocarbons, oil and gas, which cover more than 70% of total production; in 
Germany coal and nuclear satisfy more than 2/3 of electricity generation capacity. In 
Austria hydropower has 63% share and in France nuclear power has 75% share of 
generation mix. As far as interconnection is concerned, Germany is well linked with 
Austria and France. Italy and France are rather less linked as well as Italy and Austria. 
Thus, Italy is the less integrated country (Creti et al., 2010). Furthermore, since 2010, 
Germany, France and Austria have implemented a price and volume market coupling 
arrangement with the Netherlands. 
We compute hourly daily price change as the difference in (logs of) spot prices 
registered in the same hour between two consecutive days. As it is well known 
electricity cannot be stored, e.g. inventories cannot be used to arbitrage prices across 
over time. 
 
                                                 
4 Data source is Data Stream for DE, AU and FR while Italian data are freely available on GME web site 
(http://www.mercatoelettrico.org/En/Tools/Accessodati.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fEn%2fStatistiche%2fME%
2fDatiSintesi.aspx). For gas and oil we use the Zeebrugge Natural Gas series and the London Brent Crude 
Oil Index, respectively. 
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Table 1 - Fuel mix electricity generation (GWh and %) year 2009
Production from: Austria Germany Italy France 
- coal and peat 5032 7.294% 257137 43.401% 43416 14.836% 28708 5.295%
- oil 1137 1.648% 9639 1.627% 25946 8.866% 6170 1.138%
- gas 12338 17.884% 78884 13.315% 147269 50.324% 21013 3.876%
- biofuels 4003 5.802% 25928 4.376% 6015 2.055% 2125 0.392%
- waste 796 1.154% 9634 1.626% 3388 1.158% 3960 0.730%
- nuclear 134932 22.775% 409737 75.572%
- hydro* 43662 63.288% 24710 4.171% 53443 18.262% 61912 11.419%
- geothermal 2 0.003% 19 0.003% 5342 1.825% 
- solar PV 35 0.051% 6579 1.110% 676 0.231% 171 0.032%
- solar thermal 
- wind 1967 2.851% 38639 6.522% 6543 2.236% 7891 1.455%
- tide 497 0.092%
- other sources 17 0.025% 6363 1.074% 603 0.206% 
Total Production 68989   592464  292641  542184   
Source: International Energy Agency. 
 
Thus, the main empirical finding is that spot prices are characterized by volatility, 
extreme values and seasonality. Prices distribution is bimodal with two different peak 
periods: hours between 11-12 and 18-20. With this type of distribution we deem 
impossible to use a daily positional index in order to fully take in account the real data 
generation process and, consequently, we think that econometric analysis could be 
biased, partial and limited. Italian IPEX is characterized by values structurally higher if 
compared with other markets. On average, Italian prices exceed others by 30-50% for 
each hour of the day but they are characterized by a smaller range of price variation. 
Indeed in the other three markets prices have occasional spikes and go up over the 500 
Euro/MWh threshold, while this doesn't occur in Italy. Some descriptive statistics used 
in the econometric analysis are shown in table 2.  
 
Table 2 – Descpriptive statistics 
 DE AT FR IT 
 Mean 3.75 3.78 3.79 4.20 
 Median 3.71 3.73 3.74 4.22 
 Maximum 5.05 4.99 5.05 4.92 
 Minimum 0.07 2.51 2.04 0.16 
 Std. Dev. 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.30 
 Skewness -0.25 0.13 -0.07 -2.22 
 Kurtosis 5.56 2.90 3.21 25.76 
 
 
The objective is to determine whether the close proximity and integration of the 
electricity markets result in significantly different price convergence in the long run. If 
so, there is evidence that electricity market integration and convergence in the EU 
occurred. As a preliminary exercise, we test for unit root behaviour of each of the four 
series. ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) tests both in levels and first differences5. In each 
case (Table 3), we are unable to reject the unit root-null hypothesis at conventional 
                                                 
5 Critical values for these tests are provided by MacKinnon (1996). A constant term is included in each 
regression, while the number of lags is chosen such that no residual autocorrelation is evident in the 
auxiliary regressions. We have also carried out alternative unit root tests (Philips and Perron, 1988 and 
Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) to check for robustness. The results are qualitatively similar (available from the 
authors upon request). 
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nominal levels of significance and when we take the first difference we find evidence of 
stationarity in the series. 
 
Table 3 – Unit Root Tests 
ADF tets DE AT FR IT 
Deterministic part C C C C 
Test statistics -2.75 -2.76 -2.64 -2.62 
 ΔDE ΔAT ΔFR ΔIT 
Deterministic part - - - - 
Test statistics -55.79 -51.66 -56.89 -57.55 
Note. Statistics are augmented Dickey–Fuller test statistics for the null hypothesis of a unit root process; DE, AT and 
IT denote the log level of electricity spot prices for Germany, Austria, France and Italy, respectively. Δ is the first 
difference operator. The critical value at the 1% level of significance is –3.57 to two decimal places if there is a 
constant (c) in the regression, and -2.61 if no deterministic components  are included in the regression, while at the 
5% level of significance these values are -2.92 and -1.95, respectively (MacKinnon, 1996).  
 
Thus we find evidence that each of the electricity series has a unit root (or a stochastic 
trend) in its univariate time series representation. The next step is to consider the 
multivariate rapresentation of these series and test whether there are common stochastic 
trends. From an empirical point of view, given the evidence of I(1)-ness for all 
individual electricity spot market prices, testing for cointegration among them is the 
logical next step. 
 
3.2. Model specification and cointegration tests 
 
We estimate equation (2) with n= 4 (AU, DE, FR, IT) with a two-step strategy. Firstly, 
the lag length p  is chosen so estimated residuals resemble the multi-normal distribution 
as closely as possible, this being an essential requirement for a correct statistical 
inference. 
Secondly, the long-term component of the model is identified on the basis of the trace 
test and the maximum eigenvalue test (Johansen, 1995). The general-to-specific 
procedure, with maximum order of autoregression set to 36, suggests choosing p=22. 
The results of the main univariate (Table 4, Panel a) and multivariate (Table 4, Panel b) 
diagnostic tests indicate that estimated residuals match the multi-normal distribution in 
a satisfactory way both at single equation and system level. 
In table 5 trace and maximum eigenvalue test statistics suggest the presence of three 
cointegration relationships in the system at the 5 percent significance level6. In the rest 
of the table exclusion, stationary and weakly exogeneity tests are reported. Testing 
separately the null hypothesis of each coefficient being equal to zero leads to null 
rejection [Panel (b)]. Furthermore, none of the variables is stationary in the 
cointegration space, as shown by the univariate unit root and stationarity tests [Panel 
(c)]. 
                                                 
6 The choice of the cointegration rank is also robust to a graphical analysis of the recursive trace tests. 
Since the trace statistic is given by )1ln( ijT λ−− , with tTTj ,...,1= , it grows over time as long as 0≠iλ , 
while must be constant If 0→iλ . The first r trace statistics should grow linearly, while the other ones 
must be constant over time. The graph shows that the first three statistics grow linearly as expected, while 
the fourth one is less clearly increasing (graphs for recursive trace test statistics are available upon 
request). 
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Finally, only in the case of German price equation there is a clear evidence of weakly 
exogeneity. Therefore, we can consider this equation as the common stochastic trend of 
the system [Panel (d)]. 
 
Table 4 – Misspecification tests 
(a) Univariate misspecification tests 
 DE AT FR IT 
AR 1.5911 [0.1463] 1.1532 [0.3363] 0.5849 [0.7668] 0.3374 [0.9351] 
Normality 3.4745 [0.1760] 4.0960 [0.1290] 1.1350 [0.5669] 16.108 [0.0003] 
ARCH 0.9031 [0.5075] 1.1315 [0.3500] 1.5206 [0.1694] 5.1289 [0.0001] 
Heteroscedasticity 0.5027 [0.9936] 0.6682 [0.9278] 0.8185 [0.7687] 0.6991 [0.9027] 
(b) Multivariate misspecification tests 
AR 1.1765 [0.1397] 
Normality 13.024 [0.1110] 
Heteroscedasticity 0.5572 [1.0000] 
Note: p-values in square brackets 
 
Table 5 – Cointegration analysis 
 (a) Cointegration rank 
   Trace test Maximum eigenvalue test 
p-r R Eigenvalue Statistics 95% cv Statistics 95% cv 
4 0 0.0359 138.279 40.175 78.250 24.159 
3 1 0.0182 60.029 24.276 39.474 17.797 
2 2 0.009 20.554 12.320 20.547 11.225 
1 3 0.000 0.008 4.130 0..008 4.130 
(b)Test of exclusion 
r dgf 5% .v. DE AT FR IT 
3 3 7.815 69.601 (0.000) 68.726 (0.000) 33.561 (0.000) 19.986 (0.000) 
(c)Test of stationarity 
r dgf 5%c.v. DE AT FR IT 
3 1 3.841 9.848 (0.002) 10.090 (0.001) 8.656 (0.003) 11.420 (0.001) 
(d) Test of weak exogeneity 
r dgf 5%c.v. DE AT FR IT 
3 3 3.841 5.678 (0.128) 7. 923 (0.048) 12.968 (0.005) 16.377 (0.000) 
Note:(a) The critical values for trace test and maximun eigenvalue statistics are from Pesaran and Shin (2000); (b) p-
value in round brackets.  
 
3.3. Testing market integration in the long run 
 
We proceed to establish whether the cointegration vectors can be identified in terms of 
the structure which indentifies a framework of general bilateral integration between 
markets. In particular, we want to test a set of restrictions in the cointegration space of 
the form:  
1
1
1
1
1
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
t
t
t
t
t
DE
AT
y
FR
IT
β
−
−
−
−
−
⎡ ⎤−⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥′ = −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
              (3) 
This representation implies three different bilateral integration processes between 
Germany market (the common trend) and the other ones. Using a standard 2χ -
distributed LR ratio test with 3 degrees of freedom, the test statistics (5.925) indicate 
that the restrictions are not rejected by the data at the usual significance levels (p-value 
of 0.115). We also test for Granger-Causality in the whole system in order to verify if 
DE-prices “Granger-cause” the other variables in the model. Thus, we perform the usual 
F-test on the significance of lagged values of DE in the equations of AU, FR and IT. 
Under the null hypothesis "DE" does not Granger-cause "AU, FR, IT", rejection of the 
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null confirms that DE cause “AU, FR, IT" [test statistic l = 1.6592;    pval-F( l; 57, 
8264) = 0.0014]. Finally, we also perform a test for instantaneous causality, concluding 
that there does not exist instantaneous causality between “DE" and “AU, FR, IT“ [Test 
statistic: χ = 828.0805 pval-Chi(χ;3)=0.0000]. 
We compute a restricted R-model7, whose cointegration relationships are depicted in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – The cointegration vectors from the R-model 
 
Note. The plots of cointegration vectors are from the R-model. It is computed estimating the ECM representation of 
the system deleting all dummies and the short-run dynamics. The result is a model where only the long-run properties 
of the data are isolated. 
 
There appears to be a clear cointegrating relationship in all three cases. Then, we 
analyze the long-run properties of system (3), studying their persistence profiles 
(Pesaran and Shin, 1996), in order to assess how long the system takes to revert to its 
steady state path, after being hit by a system-wide shock. By construction these profiles 
should tend to zero as the number of simulation periods increases only if a cointegration 
vector analysed is genuinely stationary, while in the case of I(1) (or “near integrated”) 
series these can be different from zero for a long period. 
We simulate over a 5 years horizon the absorption path of deviations from the bilateral 
equilibrium relationship between each European market (AT, FR, IT) and the German 
one, as shown in Figure 28. 
In all cases, convergence towards the steady-state follows a decreasing trajectory, with 
adjustments from disequilibrium ending within the fifth year. The half-life of the 
deviation from the steady-state is close to five months, even if it seems to be higher for 
Italy.9 
                                                 
7 The R-model is computed estimating the VEC representation of the system deleting all dummies and the 
short -run dynamics. The result is a model where only the long-run properties of the data are isolated 
(Johanesen, 1995). 
8 The size of all the shocks analyzed in this section is set equal to one standard deviation. 
9 Half-life is defined as the number of months after which the deviation from the steady-state falls to half 
the size of the initial shock. 
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Figure 2 – Persistence profile of cointegration vectors 
 
Note. The vertical axis indicates the magnitude of the deviation (normalized to unity on impact) from the steady-state 
level. The horizontal axis measures the number of months after the shock. Simulation horizon is equal to 5 months. 
 
3.4. Robustness: oil price relevance 
 
The identification of the cointegration space described in the previous section allows 
interpreting the three long-run relations as convergence patterns between each national 
electricity price and the German one. We want to check the robustness of this key result, 
introducing into the original system information about energy input prices. In particular, 
we estimate a new VAR model in which we control for oil prices. We expect that the 
identification of the cointegration space should remain the same, if signaling process 
from German to “regional” markets is robust. Otherwise, in the presence of a “weak” 
signaling relation between markets, introduction of oil prices could lead to a different 
system representation, with a smaller role played by Germany’s electricity price. 
Cointegration tests for the model augmented by oil prices are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Robusteness: the role of Oil prices 
   Trace test Maximum eigenvalue test 
p-r r Eigenvalue Statistics 95% cv Statistics 95% cv 
5 0 0.0367 157.637 60.061 80.197 30.440 
4 1 0.0189 77.440 40.175 40.946 24.159 
3 2 0.0104 36.494 24.276 22.484 17.797 
2 3 0.0064 14.009 12.321 13.684 11.225 
1 4 0.000 0.325 4.130 0.325 4.130 
Note:(a) The VAR model cointains the original electricy price time series (Germany, Austria, France and Italy) plus 
Oil prices. We allow for a lag length of 22 (in the levels) and an unrestricted constant term in the VECM 
specification. The critical values for trace test and maximun eigenvalue statistics are from Pesaran and Shin (2000). 
 
Both trace and maximum eigenvalue test statistics suggest the presence of four 
cointegrating vectors. We assume that this new long-run relations depends on the oil 
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prices behavior10 and, therefore, we test the scheme (1) in order to verify if the first 
three long-run vectors in this new model satisfy the [1;-1] restrictions implied by our 
identification strategy. The 2χ -distributed LR ratio test with 4 degrees of freedom (test 
statistics equal to 7.068, p-value of 0.132) indicates that these restrictions are not 
rejected by the data. The scheme that identifies three different long-run integration 
patterns between each electricity market and the German one is still valid even when we 
control for the influence of oil prices in the system11. 
 
3.5. Modelling the structure of the α matrix 
 
The short-run dynamics of model is modelled using a parsimonious (subset) VEC 
model, obtained dropping those parameters in the model with p-values lower than a 
significance threshold,12 according to the Sequential Elimination of the Regressors 
Testing Procedure (SER/TP) proposed by Brüggemann and Lütkepohl (2001). 
Specifically, the statistically significant parameters of α matrix give useful information 
about how national market models move around the long-run equilibrium path. Table 7 
reports the coefficients estimated by 3SLS only for the α matrix13. The analysis of the 
elements of the loading coefficients matrix allows highlighting some interesting results. 
The equations ATΔ , FRΔ  and ITΔ  are obviously affected by the cointegration 
residuals which identify the long run convergence equilibrium between each market and 
the German system. Moreover the (absolute) values of the feedback coefficients indicate 
that adjustment speed towards equilibrium is higher for Austria. Finally, there is 
evidence of some influence of the three cointegration vectors (namely ε1,ε2 and ε3 ) on 
other market equations. 
 
Table 7 – VECM model estimated by 3SLS- The long run  
 ΔDE ΔAT ΔFR ΔIT 
1, 1t−ε  . -0.725 (0.035) -0.084 (0.043) . 
2, 1t−ε  . 0.122 (0.018) -0.248 (0.021) -0.078 (0.020) 
3, 1t−ε  . -0.064 (0.013) -0.071 (0.006) -0.365 (0.019) 
Notes. Standard errors in round brackets. ε1,ε2 and ε3 are the three cointegration vectors. 
 
Overall, this means that even if we are able to identify bilateral equilibrium conditions 
for each electricity market versus the German one, our model allows also for spill-over 
effects between markets. Therefore, even if in our model the German dynamics drives 
the integration process, there are also other interesting relationships between other 
counties which characterized the European electricity markets convergence process. 
 
                                                 
10 This result is consistent with the evidence provided by Bosco et al. (2010), where a long-run relation 
between electricity and oil prices is detected. 
11 Moreover we test for the joint hypothesis of weakly exogeneity of both German electricity prices and 
oil prices. The statistics suggest that both variables are weakly exogenous with respect the cointegration 
space (LR test of restrictions: 2χ  (3) =4.8150 [0.1859]). 
12 The AIC criterion with 1.60t =  is used as a significance threshold level for short-run parameters. This 
is motivated by the idea that, in the reduction process of the model, it is preferable to keep the coefficients 
whose statistical significance is unclear. 
13 The other coefficients are not reported, but are available under request. 
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4. Dynamic simulation: the role of global and regional shocks 
 
In this section we move from a reduced-form to a structural representation of the 
multivariate time-series model so as to ascertain the role of global and regional 
(idiosyncratic) shocks hitting the European electricity markets considered. We employ 
the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) tool, which aims at providing 
information on the relative importance of the forecast error variance of each shock as a 
function of the simulation horizon. The reduced form residuals in model tu and the 
structural residuals tv  are linked through the relationship t t= ⋅u B v , where B  is a non-
singular matrix (Warne, 1993). Retrieving v ’s from u ’s implies the unique 
determination of the n2=16 elements in B . In our identification scheme, a first set of 10 
constraints arises by assuming that structural shocks are orthonormal. Choosing the 
cointegration produces r(n-r)=3 additional restrictions and allows to distinguish 
transitory shocks (three in our case) from permanent (one) innovations. The remaining 
three restrictions are obtained by imposing a recursive scheme in the transitory shocks 
matrix in which the variables causal order is chosen according to the estimated 
adjustment coefficients size. Thus, the causal order is the following: Austria, France and 
Italy. 
The permanent shock is derived from the system common trend (i.e., its permanent 
component) and represents the global-external shock that hits in a symmetric way all 
markets. By contrast, transient impulses hit in an asymmetric way each country 
according to their different degree of interdependency. Furthermore, temporary shocks 
are aggregated so as to quantify the overall relevance of regional factors in explaining 
electricity price fluctuations. 
Table 8 shows the percentage of the variance of each variable of the system explained 
by the four shocks: global (Germany) and regional ones (Austria, France and Italy). The 
last column (mean) presents the shocks average contribution over the entire simulation 
spans (60 months). As can be seen, the German market shock (the global one) is the 
main driving force of electricity movements, confirming our interpretation of the 
symmetric signalling shock hitting other markets price formation. In particular, about 
80% of forecast variance of Austrian electricity price is explained by global shock. This 
percentage in equal to 78% and 71% for France and Italy prices, respectively. 
 
Table 8 – Forecast error variance decompositions 
 ΔAT ΔFR ΔIT Mean 
Global shock (DE) 79.91 78.03 71.40 76.45 
Regional shock (AT) 2.54 1.33 0.98 1.59 
Regional shock (FR) 15.63 18.71 13.19 15.68 
Regional shock (IT) 1.92 1.93 14.43 6.28 
Note. The permanent shock is associated to the common trend of the system (that is the German electricity spot price) 
and represents the global-external shocks that hit in a symmetric way the other markets. Individual temporary shocks 
identify idiosyncratic disturbances. The figures represent the percentage of the variance of each variable of the system 
explained by global and “regional”. The last column (mean) presents the average contribution of the shocks over the 
entire simulation period (60 months). 
 
With respect regional shocks, it is possible to note that the “domestic” shock in France 
accounts for about 18% of forecast variability of French electricity price. This 
percentage is larger than those shown by other countries (2.5% and 14.2% for Austria 
and Italy respectively) and confirms the relatively higher degree of exogeneity of 
 13
French electric system, which can be easily explained by the greater importance of 
nuclear technology in French electricity generation mix. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have estimated a model to test integration and convergence among four 
European electricity markets. Our identification strategy allows to verify the presence of 
three different long-run equilibrium conditions between the German market and 
Austrian, Italian and French ones, respectively. 
The main empirical evidences are as follows. German market behavior appears as the 
common trend for other regional markets, thus providing signaling information. This 
can be explained in two ways: (i) DE is the largest market in Central Europe and it is 
taken as a reference; (ii) pricing in electricity markets is dominated by peak-load plants, 
which typically exhibit CCGT technology (i.e. gas fired) and gas marginal price is 
largely influenced by German market operators. 
The speed of adjustment towards equilibrium and the degree of convergence is higher 
for Austria. Persistence appears to be higher in FR. This is no surprise, given that the 
French electric system is the most un-flexible (because of its very high nuclear share). 
These results seem robust even when we control for oil prices in the system and the 
identification scheme obtained in the baseline specification is confirmed. 
Forecast error variance decomposition analysis shows that the Italian market is the 
market with lowest share of global shock compared to other countries. Thus the 
signaling effect of global shocks in price formation is the least important in the Italian 
case. 
The fact that roughly 1/4 of FEVD is not explained by a global shock (which can be  
typically thought as a fuel price shock) indicates that there are other factors, like 
specific fuel mix and/or non-competitive strategic behavior, influencing equilibrium 
prices, which motivates future research. 
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